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Abstract
We study the interplay between sequential decision making and avoiding discrimination
against protected groups, when examples arrive online and do not follow distributional assump-
tions. We consider the most basic extension of classical online learning: Given a class of
predictors that are individually non-discriminatory with respect to a particular metric, how can
we combine them to perform as well as the best predictor, while preserving non-discrimination?
Surprisingly we show that this task is unachievable for the prevalent notion of equalized odds
that requires equal false negative rates and equal false positive rates across groups. On the pos-
itive side, for another notion of non-discrimination, equalized error rates, we show that running
separate instances of the classical multiplicative weights algorithm for each group achieves this
guarantee. Interestingly, even for this notion, we show that algorithms with stronger perfor-
mance guarantees than multiplicative weights cannot preserve non-discrimination.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of machine learning in the last decade has given rise to an important debate regard-
ing the ethical and societal responsibility of its offspring. Machine learning has provided a universal
toolbox enhancing the decision making in many disciplines from advertising and recommender sys-
tems to education and criminal justice. Unfortunately, both the data and their processing can
be biased against specific population groups (even inadvertently) in every single step of the pro-
cess [BS16]. This has generated societal and policy interest in understanding the sources of this
discrimination and interdisciplinary research has attempted to mitigate its shortcomings.
Discrimination is commonly an issue in applications where decisions need to be made sequentially.
The most prominent such application is online advertising where platforms need to sequentially select
which ad to display in response to particular query searches. This process can introduce discrimina-
tion against protected groups in many ways such as filtering particular alternatives [DTD15, APJ16]
and reinforcing existing stereotypes through search results [Swe13, KMM15]. Another canonical ex-
ample of sequential decision making is medical trials where underexploration on female groups often
leads to significantly worse treatments for them [LDM16]. Similar issues occur in image classifica-
tion as stressed by “gender shades” [BG18]. The reverse (overexploration in minority populations)
can also cause concerns especially if conducted in a non-transparent fashion [BBC+16].
In these sequential settings, the assumption that data are i.i.d. is often violated. Online advertising,
recommender systems, medical trials, image classification, loan decisions, criminal recidivism all
require decisions to be made sequentially. The corresponding labels are not identical across time
and can be affected by the economy, recent events, etc. Similarly labels are also not independent
across rounds – if a bank offers a loan then this decision can affect whether the loanee or their
environment will be able to repay future loans thereby affecting future labels as discussed by Liu
et al. [LDR+18]. As a result, it is important to understand the effect of this adaptivity on non-
discrimination.
The classical way to model settings that are not i.i.d. is via adversarial online learning [LW94, FS97],
which poses the question: Given a class F of predictors, how can we make online predictions that
perform as well as the best predictor from F in hindsight? The most basic online learning question
(answered via the celebrated “multiplicative weights” algorithm) concerns competing with a finite
set of predictors. The class F is typically referred to as “experts” and can be thought as “features”
of the example where we want to make online predictions that compete with the best 1-sparse
predictor.
In this work, we wish to understand the interplay between adaptivity and non-discrimination and
therefore consider the most basic extension of the classical online learning question:
Given a class of individually non-discriminatory predictors, how can we combine
them to perform as well as the best predictor, while preserving non-discrimination?
The assumption that predictors are individually non-discriminatory is a strong assumption on the
predictors and makes the task trivial in the batch setting where the algorithm is given labeled
examples and wishes to perform well on unseen examples drawn from the same distribution. This
happens because the algorithm can learn the best predictor from the labeled examples and then
follow it (since this predictor is individually non-discriminatory, the algorithm does not exhibit
discrimination). This enables us to understand the potential overhead that adaptivity is causing
and significantly strengthens any impossibility result. Moreover, we can assume that predictors
1
have been individually vetted to satisfy the non-discrimination desiderata – we therefore wish to
understand how to efficiently compose these non-discriminatory predictors while preserving non-
discrimination.
1.1 Our contribution
Our impossibility results for equalized odds. Surprisingly, we show that for a prevalent
notion of non-discrimination, equalized odds, it is impossible to preserve non-discrimination while
also competing comparably to the best predictor in hindsight (no-regret property). Equalized odds,
suggested by Hardt et al. [HPS16] in the batch setting, restricts the set of allowed predictors
requiring that, when examples come from different groups, the prediction is independent to the
group conditioned on the label. In binary classification, this means that the false negative rate
(fraction of positive examples predicted negative) is equal across groups and the same holds for the
false positive rate (defined analogously). This notion was popularized by a recent debate on potential
bias of machine learning risk tools for criminal recividism [ALMK16, Cho17, KMR17, FPCDG16].
Our impossibility results demonstrate that the order in which examples arrive significantly compli-
cates the task of achieving desired efficiency while preserving non-discrimination with respect to
equalized odds. In particular, we show that any algorithm agnostic to the group identity either
cannot achieve performance comparable to the best predictor or exhibits discrimination in some
instances (Theorem 1). This occurs in phenomenally simple settings with only two individually
non-discriminatory predictors, two groups, and perfectly balanced instances: groups are of equal
size and each receives equal number of positive and negative labels. The only imbalance exists in
the order in which the labels arrive which is also relatively well behaved – labels are generated from
two i.i.d. distributions, one in the first half of the instance and one in the second half. Although
in many settings we cannot actively use the group identity of the examples due to legal reasons
(e.g., in hiring), one may wonder whether these impossibility results disappear if we can actively
use the group information to compensate for past mistakes. We show that this is also not the case
(Theorem 2). Although our groups are not perfectly balanced, the construction is again very simple
and consists only of two groups and two predictors: one always predicting positive and one always
predicting negative. The simplicity of the settings, combined with the very strong assumption on
the predictors being individually non-discriminatory speaks to the trade-off between adaptivity and
non-discrimination with respect to equalized odds.
Our results for equalized error rates. The strong impossibility results with respect to equal-
ized odds invite the natural question of whether there exists some alternative fairness notion that,
given access to non-discriminatory predictors, achieves efficiency while preserving non-discrimination.
We answer the above positively by suggesting the notion of equalized error rates, which requires that
the average expected loss (regardless whether it stems from false positives or false negatives) encoun-
tered by each group should be the same. This notion makes sense in settings where performance
and fairness are measured with respect to the same objective. Consider a medical application where
people from different subpopulations wish to receive appropriate treatment and any error in treat-
ment costs equally both towards performance and towards fairness.1 It is morally objectionable
to discriminate against one group, e.g. based on race, using it as experimentation to enhance the
1In contrast, in equalized odds, a misprediction is only costly to the false negative metric if the true label is
positive.
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quality of service of the other, and it is reasonable to require that all subpopulations receive same
quality of service.
For this notion, we show that, if all predictors are individually non-discriminatory with respect to
equalized error rates, running separate multiplicative weights algorithms, one for each subpopulation,
preserves this non-discrimination without decay in the efficiency (Theorem 3). The key property we
use is that the multiplicative weights algorithm guarantees to perform not only no worse than the
best predictor in hindsight but also no better; this property holds for a broader class of algorithms
[GM16]. Our result applies to general loss functions beyond binary predictions and only requires
predictors to satisfy the weakened assumption of being approximately non-discriminatory.
Finally, we examine whether the decisions of running separate algorithms and running this particular
not so efficient algorithm were important for the result. We first give evidence that running separate
algorithms is essential for the result; if we run a single instance of “multiplicative weights” or “follow
the perturbed leader”, we cannot guarantee non-discrimination with respect to equalized error rates
(Theorem 4). We then suggest that the property of not performing better than the best predictor
is also crucial; in particular, better algorithms that satisfy the stronger guarantee of low shifting
regret [HW01, BM05, LS15] are also not able to guarantee this non-discrimination (Theorem 5).
These algorithms are considered superior to classical no-regret algorithms as they can better adapt
to changes in the environment, which has nice implications in game-theoretic settings [LST16].
Our latter impossibility result is a first application where having these strong guarantees against
changing benchmarks is not necessarily desired and therefore is of independent learning-theoretic
interest.
1.2 Related work
There is a large line of work on fairness and non-discrimination in machine learning (see [PRT08,
CKP09, DHP+12, ZWS+13, JKMR16, HPS16, Cho17, KMR17, KNRW18] for a non-exhaustive list).
We elaborate on works that either study group notions of fairness or fairness in online learning.
The last decade has seen a lot of work on group notions of fairness, mostly in classification setting.
Examples include notions that compare the percentage of members predicted positive such as demo-
graphic parity [CKP09], disparate impact [FFM+15], equalized odds [HPS16] and calibration across
groups [Cho17, KMR17]. There is no consensus on a universal fairness notion; rather the specific
notion considered is largely task-specific. In fact, previous works identified that these notions are
often not compatible to each other [Cho17, KMR17], posed concerns that they may introduce unin-
tentional discrimination [CDG18], and suggested the need to go beyond such observational criteria
via causal reasoning [KCP+17, KLRS17]. Prior to our work, group fairness notions have been stud-
ied primarily in the batch learning setting with the goal of optimizing a loss function subject to a
fairness constraint either in a post-hoc correction framework as proposed by Hardt et al. [HPS16] or
more directly during training from batch data [ZWS+13, GCGF16, WGOS17, ZVRG17, BDNP18]
which requires care due to the predictors being discriminatory with respect to the particular metric
of interest. The setting we focus on in this paper does not have the challenges of the above since
all predictors are non-discriminatory; however, we obtain surprising impossibility results due to the
ordering in which labels arrive.
Recently fairness in online learning has also started receiving attention. One line of work focuses on
imposing a particular fairness guarantee at all times for bandits and contextual bandits, either for
individual fairness [JKMR16, KKM+17] or for group fairness [CV17]. Another line of work points
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to counterintuitive externalities of using contextual bandit algorithms agnostic to the group identity
and suggest that heterogeneity in data can replace the need for exploration [RSWW18, KMR+18].
Moreover, following a seminal paper by Dwork et al. [DHP+12], a line of work aims to treat similar
people similarly in online settings [LRD+17, GJKR18]. Our work distinguishes itself from these
directions mainly in the objective, since we require the non-discrimination to happen in the long-
term instead of at any time; this extends the classical batch definitions of non-discrimination in the
online setting. In particular, we only focus on situations where there are enough samples from each
population of interest and we do not penalize the algorithm for a few wrong decisions, leading it to
be overly pessimistic. Another difference is that previous work focuses either on individual notions
of fairness or on i.i.d. inputs, while our work is about non-i.i.d. inputs in group notions of fairness.
2 Model
Online learning protocol with group context. We consider the classical online learning set-
ting of prediction with expert advice, where a learner needs to make sequential decisions for T
rounds by combining the predictions of a finite set F of d hypotheses (also referred to as experts).
We denote the outcome space by Y; in binary classification, this corresponds to Y = {+,−}. Addi-
tionally, we introduce a set of disjoint groups by G which identifies subsets of the population based
on a protected attribute (such as gender, ethnicity, or income).
The online learning protocol with group context proceeds in T rounds. Each round t is associated
with a group context g(t) ∈ G and an outcome y(t) ∈ Y. We denote the resulting T -length time-
group-outcome sequence tuple by σ = {(t, g(t), y(t)) ∈ N× G × Y}Tt=1. This is a random variable
that can depend on the randomness in the generation of the groups and the outcomes. We use
the shorthand σ1:τ = {(t, g(t), y(t)) ∈ N× G × Y}τt=1 to denote the subsequence until round τ . The
exact protocol for generating these sequences is described below. At round t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. An example with group context g(t) ∈ G either arrives stochastically or is adversarially se-
lected.
2. The learning algorithm or learner L commits to a probability distribution pt ∈ ∆(d) across
experts where ptf denotes the probability that she follows the advice of expert f ∈ F at
round t. This distribution pt can be a function of the sequence σ1:t−1. We call the learner
group-unaware if she ignores the group context g(τ) for all τ ≤ t when selecting pt.
3. An adversary A then selects an outcome y(t) ∈ Y. The adversary is called adaptive if the
groups/outcomes at round t = τ + 1 are a function of the realization of σ1:τ ; otherwise she is
called oblivious. The adversary always has access to the learning algorithm, but an adaptive
adversary additionally has access to the realized σ1:t−1 and hence also knows pt.
Simultaneously, each expert f ∈ F makes a prediction yˆtf ∈ Yˆ, where Yˆ is a generic prediction
space; for example, in binary classification, the prediction space could simply be the positive
or negative labels: Yˆ = {+,−}, or the probabilistic score: Yˆ = [0, 1] with yˆtf interpreted as the
probability the expert f ∈ F assigns to the positive label in round t, or even an uncalibrated
score like the output of a support vector machine: Yˆ = R.
Let ℓ : Yˆ × Y → [0, 1] be the loss function between predictions and outcomes. This leads to a
corresponding loss vector ℓt ∈ [0, 1]d where ℓtf = ℓ
(
yˆtf , y(t)
)
denotes the loss the learner incurs
if she follows expert f ∈ F .
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4. The learner then observes the entire loss vector ℓt (full information feedback) and incurs
expected loss
∑
f∈F p
t
fℓ
t
f . For classification, this feedback is obtained by observing y(t).
In this paper, we consider a setting where all the experts f ∈ F are fair in isolation (formalized
below). Regarding the group contexts, our main impossibility results (Theorems 1 and 2) assume
that the group contexts g(t) arrive stochastically from a fixed distribution, while our positive result
(Theorem 3) holds even when they are adversarially selected.
For simplicity of notation, we assume throughout the presentation that the learner’s algorithm is
producing the distribution pt of round t = τ + 1 deterministically based on σ1:τ and therefore all
our expectations are taken only over σ which is the case in most algorithms. Our results extend
when the algorithm uses extra randomness to select the distribution.
Group fairness in online learning. We now define non-discrimination (or fairness) with respect
to a particular evaluation metricM, e.g. in classification, the false negative rate metric (FNR) is the
fraction of examples with positive outcome predicted negative incorrectly. For any realization of the
time-group-outcome sequence σ and any group g ∈ G, metric M induces a subset of the population
Sσg (M) that is relevant to it. For example, in classification, Sσg (FNR) = {t : g(t) = g, y(t) = +}
is the set of positive examples of group g. The performance of expert f ∈ F on the subpopulation
Sσg (M) is denoted by Mσf (g) = 1|Sσg (M)|
∑
t∈Sσg (M)
ℓtf .
Definition 1. An expert f ∈ F is called fair in isolation with respect to metric M if, for every
sequence σ, her performance with respect to M is the same across groups, i.e. Mσf (g) = Mσf (g′)
for all g, g′ ∈ G.
Similarly, the learner’s performance on this subpopulation isMσL(g) = 1|Sσg (M)|
∑
t∈Sσg (M)
∑
f∈F p
t
fℓ
t
f .
To formalize our non-discrimination desiderata, we require the algorithm to have similar expected
performance across groups, when given access to fair in isolation predictors. We make the following
assumptions to avoid trivial impossibility results due to low-probability events or underrepresented
populations. First, we take expectation over sequences generated by the adversary A (that has
access to the learning algorithm L). Second, we require the relevant subpopulations to be, in ex-
pectation, large enough. Our positive results do not depend on either of these assumptions. More
formally:
Definition 2. Consider a set of experts F such that each expert is fair in isolation with respect
to metric M. Learner L is called α-fair in composition with respect to metric M if, for all
adversaries that produce Eσ[min(|Sσg (M)|, |Sσg′(M)|)] = Ω(T ) for all g, g′, it holds that:∣∣Eσ[MσL(g)] − Eσ[MσL(g′)]∣∣ ≤ α.
We note that, in many settings, we wish to have non-discrimination with respect to multiple metrics
simultaneously. For instance, equalized odds requires fairness in composition both with respect to
false negative rate and with respect to false positive rate (defined analogously). Since we provide an
impossibility result for equalized odds, focusing on only one metric makes the result even stronger.
Regret notions. The typical way to evaluate the performance of an algorithm in online learning
is via the notion of regret. Regret is comparing the performance of the algorithm to the performance
5
of the best expert in hindsight on the realized sequence σ as defined below:
RegT =
T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f − min
f⋆∈F
T∑
t=1
ℓtf⋆ .
In the above definition, regret is a random variable depending on the sequence σ; therefore depending
on the randomness in groups/outcomes.
An algorithm satisfies the no-regret property (or Hannan consistency) in our setting if for any losses
realizable by the above protocol, the regret is sublinear in the time horizon T , i.e. RegT = o(T ).
This property ensures that, as time goes by, the average regret vanishes. Many online learning
algorithms, such as multiplicative weights updates satisfy this property with RegT = O(
√
T log(d)).
We focus on the notion of approximate regret, which is a relaxation of regret that gives a small
multiplicative slack to the algorithm. More formally, ǫ-approximate regret with respect to expert
f⋆ ∈ F is defined as:
ApxRegǫ,T (f
⋆) =
T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f − (1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
ℓtf⋆ .
We note that typical algorithms guarantee ApxRegǫ,T (f
⋆) = O(ln(d)/ǫ) simultaneously for all experts
f⋆ ∈ F . When the time-horizon is known in advance, by setting ǫ =√ln(d)/T , such a bound implies
the aforementioned regret guarantee. In the case when the time horizon is not known, one can also
obtain a similar guarantee by adjusting the learning rate of the algorithm appropriately.
Our goal is to develop online learning algorithms that combine fair in isolation experts in order to
achieve both vanishing average expected ǫ-approximate regret, i.e. for any fixed ǫ > 0 and f⋆ ∈ F ,
Eσ[ApxRegǫ,T (f
⋆)] = o(T ), and also non-discrimination with respect to fairness metrics of interest.
3 Impossibility results for equalized odds
In this section, we study a popular group fairness notion, equalized odds, in the context of online
learning. A natural extension of equalized odds for online settings would require that the false
negative rate, i.e. percentage of positive examples predicted incorrectly, is the same across all
groups and the same also holds for the false positive rate. We assume that our experts are fair
in isolation with respect to both false negative as well as false positive rate. A weaker notion of
equalized odds is equality of opportunity where the non-discrimination condition is required to be
satisfied only for the false negative rate. We first study whether it is possible to achieve the vanishing
regret property while guaranteeing α-fairness in composition with respect to false negative rate for
arbitrarily small α. When the input is i.i.d., this is trivial as we can learn the best expert in O(log d)
rounds and then follow its advice; since the expert is fair in isolation, this will guarantee vanishing
non-discrimination.
In contrast, we show that, in a non-i.i.d. online setting, this goal is unachievable. We demonstrate
this in phenomenally benign settings where there are just two groups G = {A,B} that come from
a fixed distribution and just two experts that are fair in isolation (with respect to false negative
rate) even per round – not only ex post. Our first construction (Theorem 1) shows that any no-
regret learning algorithm that is group-unaware cannot guarantee fairness in composition, even in
instances that are perfectly balanced (each pair of label and group gets 1/4 of the examples) – the
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only adversarial component is the order in which these examples arrive. This is surprising because
such a task is straightforward in the stochastic setting as all hypotheses are non-discriminatory. We
then study whether actively using the group identity can correct the aforementioned similarly to
how it enables correction against discriminatory predictors [HPS16]. The answer is negative even
in this scenario (Theorem 2): if the population is sufficiently not balanced, any no-regret learning
algorithm will be unfair in composition with respect to false negative rate even if they are not
group-unaware.
3.1 Group-unaware algorithms
We first present the theorem about group-unaware algorithms.
Theorem 1. For all α < 3/8, there exists ǫ > 0 such that any group-unaware algorithm that satisfies
Eσ
[
ApxRegǫ,T (f)
]
= o(T ) for all f ∈ F is α-unfair in composition with respect to false negative rate
even for perfectly balanced sequences. In particular, for any group-unaware algorithm that ensures
vanishing approximate regret2, there exists an oblivious adversary for assigning labels such that:
• In expectation, half of the population corresponds to each group.
• For each group, in expectation half of its labels are positive and the other half are negative.
• The false negative rates of the two groups differ by α.
Proof. Consider an instance that consists of two groups G = {A,B}, two experts F = {hn, hu}, and
two phases: Phase I and Phase II. Group A is the group we end up discriminating against while
group B is boosted by the discrimination with respect to false negative rate. At each round t the
groups arrive stochastically with probability 1/2 each, independent of σ1:t−1.
The experts output a score value in Yˆ = [0, 1], where score yˆtf ∈ Yˆ can be interpreted as the
probability that expert f assigns to label being positive in round t, i.e. y(t) = +. The loss function
is the expected probability of error given by ℓ(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −}+ (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The two
experts are very simple: hn always predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0 for all t, and hu is an unbiased
expert who, irrespective of the group or the label, makes an inaccurate prediction with probability
β = 1/4 +
√
ǫ, i.e. yˆthu = β · 1{y(t) = −} + (1 − β) · 1{y(t) = +} for all t. Both experts are fair in
isolation with respect to both false negative and false positive rates: FNR is 100% for hn and β for
hu regardless the group, and FPR is 0% for hn and β for hu, again independent of the group. The
instance proceeds in two phases:
1. Phase I lasts for T/2 rounds. The adversary assigns negative labels on examples with group
context B and assigns a label uniformly at random to examples from group A.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
(a) if the expected probability the algorithm assigns to expert hu in Phase I is at least
Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
ǫ · T then the adversary assigns negative labels for both groups
(b) else the adversary assigns positive labels to examples with group context B while exam-
ples from group A keep receiving positive and negative labels with probability equal to
half.
2This requirement is weaker than vanishing regret so the impossibility result applies to vanishing regret algorithms.
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We will show that for any algorithm with vanishing approximate regret property, i.e. with
ApxRegǫ,T (f) = o(T ), the condition for the first world is never triggered and hence the above
sequence is indeed balanced.
We now show why this instance is unfair in composition with respect to false negative rate. The
proof involves showing the following two claims:
1. In Phase I, any ǫ-approximate regret algorithm needs to select the negative expert hn most of
the times to ensure small approximate regret with respect to hn. This means that, in Phase
I (where we encounter half of the positive examples from group A and none from group B),
the false negative rate of the algorithm is close to 1.
2. In Phase II, any ǫ-approximate regret algorithm should quickly catch up to ensure small
approximate regret with respect to hu and hence the false negative rate of the algorithm is
closer to β. Since the algorithm is group-unaware, this creates a mismatch between the false
negative rate of B (that only receives false negatives in this phase) and A (that has also
received many false negatives before).
Upper bound on probability of playing hu in Phase I. We now formalize the first claim by
showing that any algorithm with Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
ǫ · T does not satisfy the approximate regret
property. The algorithm suffers an expected loss of β every time it selects expert hu. On the other
hand, when selecting expert hn, it suffers a loss of 0 for members of group B and an expected loss
of 1/2 for members of group A. As a result, the expected loss of the algorithm in the first phase is:
Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · ℓtf
 = Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 · β + Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthn · 1g(t)=A
 · 1
2
= Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 · β +
T
2
− Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 · 1
4
=
T
8
+
(
β − 1
4
)
· Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 = T
8
+
√
ǫ · Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu

In contrast, the negative expert has, in Phase I, expected loss of:
Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
ℓthn
 = T
8
.
Therefore, if Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
ǫ · T , the ǫ-approximate regret of the algorithm with respect to hn
is linear to the time-horizon T (and therefore not vanishing) since:
Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · ℓtf − (1 + ǫ)
T/2∑
t=1
ℓthN
 = T
8
+
√
ǫ · Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
− (1 + ǫ)T
8
>
7ǫ
8
· T.
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Upper bound on probability of playing hn in Phase II. Regarding the second claim, we
first show that Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
≤ 16√ǫ · T for any ǫ-approximate regret algorithm with ǫ < 1/16.
The expected loss of the algorithm in the second phase is:
Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f
 = Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 3
4
+
T
2
− Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · β.
Since, in Phase I, the best case scenario for the algorithm is to always select expert hn and incur a
loss of T/8, this implies that for ǫ < 1/16:
Eσ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f
 ≥ T
8
+
T
2
· β + Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 ·(3
4
− β
)
=
(1 + 2
√
ǫ) · T
4
+ Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · (1
2
−√ǫ
)
>
T
4
+ Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 1
4
.
On the other hand, the cumulative expected loss of the β-inaccurate expert hu is
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓthu
]
= β · T = T
4
+
√
ǫ · T.
Therefore, if the algorithm has Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
> 16
√
ǫ · T , the ǫ-approximate regret of the
algorithm with respect to hu is linear to the time-horizon since ǫ ≤ 1, we have:
Eσ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f − (1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
ℓthu
 >
T
4
+ Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 1
4
− (1 + ǫ) ·(T
4
+
√
ǫ · T
)
≥ Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 1
4
− 3√ǫ · T > √ǫ · T
The last inequality holds since ǫ · T/4+ ǫ · √ǫ · T +√ǫ · T ≤ 3√ǫ · T for ǫ ≤ 1.
Thus, we have shown that for, for ǫ < 1/16, any algorithm with vanishing approximate regret,
necessarily we have Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
≤ 16√ǫ · T .
Gap in false negative rates between groups A and B. We now compute the expected false
negative rates for the two groups, assuming that ǫ < 1/16. Since we focus on algorithms that satisfy
the vanishing regret property, we have already established that:
Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 ≤ √ǫ · T and Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 ≤ 16√ǫ · T. (1)
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For ease of notation, let GtA,+ = 1{g(t) = A, y(t) = +} and GtB,+ = 1{g(t) = B, y(t) = +}. Since
the group context at round t arrives independent of σ1:t−1 and the adversary is oblivious, we have
that GtA,+, G
t
B,+ are independent of σ
1:t−1, and hence also independent of pthu , p
t
hn
.
Since the algorithm is group-unaware, the expected cumulative probability that the algorithm uses
hn in Phase II is the same for both groups. We combine this with the facts that under the online
learning protocol with group context, examples of group B arrive stochastically with probability
half but only receive positive labels in Phase II, we obtain:
Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn ·GtB,+
 = 1
2
· Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 ≤ 8√ǫ · T. (2)
Recall that group B in Phase I has no positive labels, hence the false negative rate on group B is:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(B)] = Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)∑T
t=T/2+1 ·GtB,+
]
= β + Eσ
[
(1− β) ·∑Tt=T/2+1GtB,+ · pthn∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+
]
In order to upper bound the above false negative rate, we denote the following good event by
EB(η) =
σ1:T :
T∑
t=T/2+1
GtB,+ > (1− η)E
 T∑
t=T/2+1
GtB,+
.
By Chernoff bound, the probability of the bad event is:
P
[¬EB(η)] = exp
−η2 · E
[∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+
]
2
.
For ηB =
√
16 log(T )/T , this implies that P[¬EB(ηB)] ≤ 1/T 2 since Eσ[
∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+] = T/4.
Therefore, by first using the bound on
∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+ on the good event and the bound on the
probability of the bad event, and then taking the limit T →∞, it holds that:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(B)] = β + Eσ
[
(1− β) ·∑Tt=T/2+1GtB,+ · pthn∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+
]
≤ β + 1− β
1− ηB ·
8
√
ǫ · T
T/4
· P[EB(ηB)]+ 1 · P[¬EB(ηB)]
≤ β + 32
√
ǫ
1− ηB +
1
T 2
→ 1
4
+ 33
√
ǫ.
We now move to the false negative rate of A:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(A)] = Eσ
[∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
]
.
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Similarly as before, letting EA(η) =
{
σ1:T :
∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ < (1 + η)E
[∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
]}
and, since P[¬EA(η)] =
exp
(−η2·E[∑Tt=1GtA,+]/3), we obtain that, for ηA =√24 log(T )/T , P[¬EA(ηA)] = 1/T 2.
Recall that for our instance Eσ
[
GtA,+
]
= T/4 and GtA,+ is independent of p
t
hu
. From our previous
analysis we also know that:
Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthuG
t
A,+
 ≤ √ǫ · T
4
and Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthuG
t
A,+
 ≤ T
8
(3)
As a result, using that E
[∑T/2
t=1G
t
A,+
]
= E
[∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
A,+
]
= T8 and Inequalities (3), we obtain:
Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
GtA,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)]
= Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
GtA,+ · −
T∑
t=1
GtA,+ · pthu(1− β)
]
≥ T
4
(
1− (1− β) · (1
2
+
√
ǫ)
)
.
Therefore, similarly with before, it holds that:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(A)] = Eσ
[∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
]
≥ 1− (1− β) · (
1
2 +
√
ǫ)
(1 + ηA)
· P[EA(ηA)]+ 0 · P[¬EA(ηA)]
≥
1
2 −
√
ǫ+ β/2
1 + ηA
(
1− 1
T 2
)
>
1
2 −
√
ǫ+ 1/8
1 + ηA
(
1− 1
T 2
)
→ 5
8
−√ǫ.
As a result, the difference between the false negative rate in group A and the one at group B is
3/8+ 34
√
ǫ which can go arbitrarily close to 3/8 by appropriately selecting ǫ to be small enough, for
any vanishing approximate regret algorithm. This concludes the proof.
3.2 Group-aware algorithms
We now turn our attention to group-aware algorithms, that can use the group context of the example
to select the probability of each expert and provide a similar impossibility result. There are three
changes compared to the impossibility result we provided for group-unaware algorithms. First, the
adversary is not oblivious but instead is adaptive. Second, we do not have perfect balance across
populations but instead require that the minority population arrives with probability b < 0.49, while
the majority population arrives with probability 1− b. Third, the labels are not equally distributed
across positive and negative for each population but instead positive labels for one group are at least
a c percentage of the total examples of the group for a small c > 0. Although the upper bounds
on b and c are not optimized, our impossibility result cannot extend to b = c = 1/2. Understanding
whether one can achieve fairness in composition for some values of b and c is an interesting open
question. Our impossibility guarantee is the following:
Theorem 2. For any group imbalance b < 0.49 and 0 < α < 0.49−0.99b1−b , there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that
for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ0 any algorithm that satisfies Eσ
[
ApxRegǫ,T (f)
]
= o(T ) for all f ∈ F , is α-unfair in
composition.
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Proof. The instance has two groups: G = {A,B}. Examples with group context A are discriminated
against and arrive randomly with probability b < 1/2 while examples with group context B are
boosted by the discrimination and arrive with the remaining probability 1− b. There are again two
experts F = {hn, hp}, which output score values in Yˆ = [0, 1], where yˆtf can be interpreted as the
probability that expert f assigns to label being + in round t. We use the earlier loss function of
ℓ(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −} + (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The first expert hn is again pessimistic and always
predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0, while the other expert hp is optimistic and always predicts positive,
i.e. yˆthp = 1. These experts again satisfy fairness in isolation with respect to equalized odds (false
negative rate and false positive rate). Let c = 1/1012 denote the percentage of the input that is about
positive examples for A, ensuring that |Sσg (FNR)| = Ω(T ). The instance proceeds in two phases.
1. Phase I lasts Θ · T rounds for Θ = 101c. The adversary assigns negative labels on examples
with group context B. For examples with group context A, the adversary acts as following:
• if the algorithm assigns probability on the negative expert below γ(ǫ) = 99−2ǫ100 , i.e.
pthn(σ
1:t−1) < γ(ǫ), then the adversary assigns negative label.
• otherwise, the adversary assigns positive labels.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
(a) the adversary assigns negative labels to both groups if the expected number of times that
the algorithm selected the negative expert with probability higher than γ(ǫ) on members
of group A is less than c · b · T , i.e. Eσ
[
1
{
t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ γ(ǫ)
}]
< c · b · T .
(b) otherwise she assigns positive labels to examples with group context B and negative
labels to examples with group context A.
Note that, as before, the condition for the first world will never be triggered by any no-regret
learning algorithm (we elaborate on that below) which ensures that Eσ |SσA(FNR)| ≥ c · b · T .
The proof is based on the following claims:
1. In Phase I, any vanishing approximate regret algorithm enters the second world of Phase II.
2. This implies a lower bound on the false negative rate on A, i.e. FNR(A) ≥ γ(ǫ) = 99−2ǫ100 .
3. In Phase II, any ǫ-approximate regret algorithm assigns large enough probability to the positive
expert hp for group B. This implies an upper bound on the false negative rate on B, i.e.
FNR(B) ≤ 1/2(1−b). Therefore this provides a gap in the false negative rates of at least α.
Proof of first claim. To prove the first claim, we apply the method of contradiction. Assume
that the algorithm has Eσ
[
1
{
t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ γ(ǫ)
}]
< c · b · T . This means that the
algorithm faces an expectation of at least (Θ − c) · b · T negative examples, while predicting the
negative expert with probability at most γ(ǫ) = 99−2ǫ100 ,thereby making an error with probability
1− γ(ǫ). Therefore the expected loss of the algorithm is at least:
Eσ
Θ·T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · ℓtf
 > (Θ− c) · b · T · (1− γ(ǫ)) = c · b · (1 + 2ǫ) · T.
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At the same time, expert hn makes at most c · b · T errors (at the positive examples)
Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
ℓthn
]
< c · b · T.
Therefore, if Eσ
[
1{t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ f(ǫ)}
]
< c · b · T , the ǫ-approximate regret of the
algorithm with respect to hn is linear to the time-horizon T (and therefore not vanishing) since:
Eσ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f − (1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
ℓthn
 > ǫ · c · b · T.
This violates the vanishing approximate regret property, thereby leading to contradiction.
Proof of second claim. The second claim follows directly by the above construction, since
positive examples only appear in Phase I when the probability of error on them is greater than γ(ǫ).
Proof of third claim. Having established that any vanishing approximate regret algorithm will
always enter the second world, we now focus on the expected loss of expert hp in this case. This
expert makes errors at most in all Phase I and in the examples of Phase II with group context A:
Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
ℓthp
]
≤ Θ · T + b · (1−Θ) · T ≤ Θ · T + 0.49 · (1−Θ) · T
Since group B has only positive examples in Phase II, the expected loss of the algorithm is at least:
Eσ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f
 ≥ Eσ
[
T∑
t=Θ·T+1
pthn · 1g(t)=B
]
We now show that Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 p
t
hn
· 1g(t)=B
]
≤ (1/2+ ǫ) · (1−Θ) · T . If this is not the case, then
the algorithm does not have vanishing ǫ-approximate regret with respect to expert hp since:
Eσ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptfℓ
t
f − (1 + ǫ)
T∑
t=1
ℓthp
 > (1
2
+ ǫ
)
· (1−Θ)T − (1 + ǫ) · 0.49 · (1−Θ)T − (1 + ǫ)ΘT
≥
(
1
2
+ ǫ− 0.49 − 0.49ǫ
)
· (1−Θ) · T − (1 + ǫ) ·Θ · T
> (0.01 + 0.51ǫ) · 100
101
· T − 1 + ǫ
101
· T ≥ 50
101
ǫ · T
Given the above, we now establish a gap in the fairness with respect to false negative rate. Since
group A only experiences positive examples when expert hn is offered probability higher than
γ(ǫ) = 99−2ǫ100 , this means that:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(A)]→ 0.99 − 0.02ǫ
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Regarding group B, we need to take into account the low-probability event that the actual realization
has significantly less than (1−b)(1−Θ)·T examples of group B in Phase II (all are positive examples).
This can be handled via similar Chernoff bounds as in the proof of the previous theorem. As a result,
the expected false negative rate at group B is:
Eσ[FNR
σ
L(B)]→
Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 p
t
hn
· 1g(t)=B
]
Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 ·1g(t)=B
] ≤ (1/2+ ǫ) · (1−Θ) · T
(1− b) · (1−Θ) · T =
1/2+ ǫ
1− b
which establishes a gap in the fairness with respect to false negative rate of α→ 0.49−0.99b1−b selecting
ǫ > 0 appropriately small.
4 Fairness in composition with respect to an alternative metric
The negative results of the previous section give rise to a natural question of whether fairness in
composition can be achieved for some other fairness metric in an online setting.
We answer this question positively by suggesting the equalized error rates metric EER which cap-
tures the average loss over the total number of examples (independent of whether this loss comes
from false negative or false positive examples). The relevant subset induced by this metric Sσg (EER)
is the set of all examples coming from group g ∈ G. We again assume that experts are fair in iso-
lation with respect to equalized error rate and show that a simple scheme where we run separately
one instance of multiplicative weights for each group achieves fairness in composition (Theorem 3).
The result holds for general loss functions (beyond pure classification) and is robust to the experts
only being approximately fair in isolation. A crucial property we use is that multiplicative weights
not only does not perform worse than the best expert; it also does not perform better. In fact, this
property holds more generally by online learning algorithms with optimal regret guarantees [GM16].
Interestingly, not all algorithms can achieve fairness in composition even with respect to this refined
notion. We provide two algorithm classes where this is unachievable. First, we show that any
algorithm (subject to a technical condition satisfied by algorithms such as multiplicative weights
and follow the perturbed leader) that ignores the group identity can be unboundedly unfair with
respect to equalized error rates (Theorem 4). This suggests that the algorithm needs to actively
discriminate based on the groups to achieve fairness with respect to equalized error rates. Second,
we show a similar negative statement for any algorithm that satisfies the more involved guarantee
of small shifting regret, therefore outperforming the best expert (Theorem 5). This suggests that
the algorithm used should be good but not too good. This result is, to the best of our knowledge, a
first application where shifting regret may not be desirable which may be of independent interest.
4.1 The positive result
We run separate instances of multiplicative weights with a fixed learning rate η, one for each group.
More formally, for each pair of expert f ∈ F and group g ∈ G, we initialize weights w1f,g = 1.
At round t = {1, 2, . . . , T}, an example with group context g(t) arrives and the learner selects a
probability distribution based to the corresponding weights: ptf =
wt
f,g(t)∑
j∈F w
t
j,g(t)
. Then the weights
corresponding to group g(t) are updated exponentially: wt+1f,g = w
t
f,g · (1− η)ℓ
t
f
·1{g(t)=g}.
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Theorem 3. For any α > 0 and any ǫ < α such that running separate instances of multiplicative
weights for each group with learning rate η = min(ǫ, α/6) guarantees α-fairness in composition and
ǫ-approximate regret of at most O(|G| log(d)/ǫ).
Proof. The proof is based on the property that multiplicative weights performs not only no worse
than the best expert in hindsight but also no better. Therefore the average performance of multi-
plicative weights at each group is approximately equal to the average performance of the best expert
in that group. Since the experts are fair in isolation, the average performance of the best expert
in all groups is the same which guarantees the equalized error rates desideratum. We make these
arguments formal below.
We follow the classical potential function analysis of multiplicative weights but apply bidirectional
bounds to also lower bound the performance of the algorithm by the performance of the comparator.
For each group g ∈ G and every expert f ∈ F , let Lf,g =
∑
t:g(t)=g ℓ
t
f ·1{g(t) = g} be the cumulative
loss of expert f in examples with group context g, and Lˆg =
∑T
t=1
∑
f∈F p
t
fℓ
t
f ·1{g(t) = g} to denote
the expected loss of the algorithm on these examples. We also denote the best in hindsight expert
on these examples by f⋆(g) = argminf∈F Lf,g. Recall that w
t
f,g = (1− η)
∑
τ≤t:g(τ)=g ℓ
τ
f is the weight
of expert f in the instance of group g and let Wt,g =
∑
j∈F w
t
j,g be its potential function.
To show that the algorithm does not perform much worse than any expert, we follow the classical
potential function analysis and, since (1− η)x ≤ 1− ηx for all x ∈ [0, 1] and η ≤ 1, we obtain:
Wt+1,g =
∑
j∈F
wtj,g · (1− η)ℓ
t
j ·1{g(t)=g} ≤
∑
j∈F
wtj,g · (1− ηℓtj · 1{g(t) = g}) =Wt,g · (1− η
∑
j∈F
ptjℓ
t
j).
By the classical analysis, for all f ∈ F and g ∈ G:
wT+1f,g = (1− η)
∑T
t=1 ℓ
t
f
·1{gt=g} ≤WT+1,g ≤ d ·
T∏
t=1
(1− η
∑
j∈F
ptjℓ
t
j · 1{g(t) = g})
where the left inequality follows from the fact that all summands of WT+1,g are positive and the
right inequality follows by unrolling WT+1,g and using that W1,g = d.
Taking logarithms and using that −η − η2 < ln(1 − η) < −η for η < 1/2, this implies that for all
f ∈ F :
Lˆg ≤ (1 + η) · Lf,g + ln(d)
η
(4)
We now use the converse side of the inequalities to show that multiplicative weights also does not
perform much better than the best expert in hindsight f⋆(g). Using that (1− η)x ≥ 1− η(1 + η)x
for all x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain:
Wt+1,g =
∑
j∈F
wtj,g · (1− η)ℓ
t
j ·1{g(t)=g} ≥
∑
j∈F
wtj,g ·
(
1− η(1 + η) · ℓtj · 1{g(t) = g}
)
= Wt,g ·
1− η(1 + η)∑
j∈F
ptiℓ
t
i
.
15
Using that f⋆(g) is the best expert in hindsight, we can upper bound
∑
j∈F w
t
j,g ≤ d ·maxj∈F wtj,g =
d ·maxf∈F (1− η)
∑t
t=1 ℓ
t
f
1{gt=g}. Similarly to before, it therefore follows that:
d · (1− η)
∑T
t=1 ℓ
t
f⋆(g)
1{gt=g} ≥WT+1 ≥ d ·
T∏
t=1
1− η(1 + η)∑
j∈F
ptjℓ
t
j

which, for η < 1/2, implies that:
L̂g ≥ (1− 4η) · Lf⋆(g),g (5)
The expected ǫ-approximate regret of this algorithm is at most 6 · |G| times the one of a single
multiplicative weights instance (by summing over inequalities (4) for all g ∈ G and since ǫ/6 ≤ η ≤ ǫ).
What is left to show is that the α-fairness in composition guarantee is satisfied, that is there exists
T0 (function of α and ǫ) such that when the number of examples from each group is at least T0, the
maximum difference between average expected losses across groups is bounded by α. Let g⋆ be the
group with the smallest average expected loss. We will show that the maximum difference from the
average expected loss of any other group g is at most α for T0 = 6 ln(d)/ηα. Since the experts are fair
in isolation, we know that Lf,g|{t:gt=g}| =
Lf,g′
|{t:gt=g′}| for all f ∈ F and g, g′ ∈ G. Combining this with
inequalities (4) and (5) and the fact that the losses are in [0, 1] and η ≤ α/6, we obtain:
L̂g
|{t : g(t) = g}| −
L̂g⋆
|{t : g(t) = g⋆}| ≤
(1 + η) · Lf⋆(g),g
|{t : g(t) = g}| +
ln(d)
η · |{t : g(t) = g}| −
(1− 4η) · Lf⋆(g⋆),g⋆
|{t : g(t) = g⋆}|
≤ 5η · Lf⋆(g⋆),g⋆|{t : g(t) = g⋆}| +
ln(d)
η · T0 ≤ α.
Remark 1. If the instance is instead only approximately fair in isolation with respect to equalized
error rates, i.e. the error rates of the two experts are not exactly equal but within some constant κ,
the same analysis implies (α+ κ)-fairness in composition with respect to equalized error rates.
4.2 Impossibility results
Group-unaware algorithms. In the previous algorithm, it was crucial that the examples of the
one group do not interfere with the decisions of the algorithm on the other group. We show that,
had we run one multiplicative weights algorithm in a group-unaware way, we would not have ac-
complished fairness in composition. In fact, this impossibility result holds for any algorithm with
vanishing ǫ-approximate regret where the learning dynamic (pt at each round t) is a deterministic
function of the difference between the cumumative losses of the experts (without taking into con-
sideration their identity). This is satisfied, for instance by multiplicative weights and follow the
perturbed leader with a constant learning rate. Unlike previous section, the impossibility results for
equalized error rates require groups to arrive adversarially (which also occurs in the above positive
result).
Theorem 4. For any α > 0 and for any ǫ > 0, running a single algorithm from the above class in
a group-unaware way is α-unfair in composition with respect to equalized error rate.
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Proof. The instance has two groups G = {A,B} that come in an adversarial order, two experts
F = {f1, f2}, and consists of four phases of equal size. At each phase one predictor is always correct
and the other one always incorrect.
1. In Phase I {1, . . . , T/4}, examples of group A arrive and the first predictor is correct: ℓtf1 = 0
and ℓtf2 = 1.
2. In Phase II {T/4 + 1, . . . , T/2}, examples of group B arrive and the second predictor is the
correct one: ℓtf1 = 1 and ℓ
t
f2
= 0.
3. In Phase III {T/2, . . . , 3T/4+1}, examples of group A arrive and the second predictor is again
the better one, i.e. ℓtf1 = 1 and ℓ
t
f2
= 0.
4. Finally, in Phase IV {3T/4+1, . . . , T}, examples of group B arrive and now the first predictor
is accurate: ℓtf1 = 0 and ℓ
t
f2
= 1.
Note that both experts are fair in isolation with respect to equalized error rates as they both have
50% error rate in each group.
Since the loss of the first expert is 0 in the first quarter of the setting:
∑T/4
t=1 ℓf1 = 0, any algorithm
with vanishing approximate regret needs to have sublinear loss during this quarter to be robust
against an adversary that continues giving 0 losses to f1. Therefore, in particular, it holds that:
T/4∑
t=1
pf2 <
1− α
8
T.
As a result, the error rate on group A is at most EER(A) ≤ 1−α2 in Phase I and, since the algorithm’s
distribution is deterministic based on the difference in the losses, this also applies to Phase III.
Regarding group B, note that any time t where an example of group B arrives has a 1− 1 mapping
to the time t − T/4 where a member from group A came, where the predictions of the algorithm
are the same since the difference between losses are the same. Therefore, by our assumption on the
dynamic, the cumulative probability the correct expert is upper bounded by 1−α2 which implies that
group B incurs an equalized error rate of EER(B) ≥ 1+α2 . Thi concludes the proof.
Shifting algorithms. The reader may be also wondering whether it suffices to just run separate
learning algorithms in the two groups or whether multiplicative weights has a special property. In
the following theorem, we show that the latter is the case. In particular, multiplicative weights
has the property of not doing better than the best expert in hindsight. The main representative of
algorithms that do not have such a property are the algorithms that achieve low approximate regret
compared to a shifting benchmark (tracking the best expert). More formally, approximate regret
against a shifting comparator f⋆ = (f⋆(1), . . . , f⋆(T )) is defined as:
ApxRegǫ,T (f
⋆) =
∑
t
ptfℓ
t
f − (1 + ǫ)
∑
t
ℓtf⋆(t),
and typical guarantees are E[ApxReg(f⋆)] = O(K(f⋆)·ln(dT )/ǫ) where K(f⋆) =
∑T
t=2 1{f⋆(t) 6= f⋆(t−
1)} is the number of switches in the comparator. We show that any algorithm that can achieve such
a guarantee even when K(f⋆) = 2 does not satisfy fairness in composition with respect to equalized
error rate. This indicates that, for the fairness with equalized error rates purpose, the algorithm
not being too good is essential.
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Theorem 5. For any α < 1/2 and ǫ > 0, any algorithm that can achieve the vanishing approximate
regret property against shifting comparators f of length K(f) = 2, running separate instances of
the algorithm for each group is α-unfair in composition with respect to equalized error rate.
Proof. Our instance has two groups G = {A,B}, two experts F = {f1, f2}, and three phases.
1. Phase I lasts for half of the time horizon {1, . . . , T/2} and during this time, we receive examples
from group A. At round t, the adversary selects loss ℓtf = 1 for the expert f ∈ F that is
predicted with higher probability (ptf ≤ 1/2) and ℓth = 0 for the other expert h ∈ F − {f}.
2. Phase II lasts
∑T/2
τ=1 ℓ
τ
f1
rounds and the adversary selects losses ℓtf1 = 1 and ℓ
t
f2
= 0.
3. Phase III lasts
∑T/2
τ=1 ℓ
τ
f2
rounds and the adversary selects losses ℓtf1 = 0 and ℓ
t
f2
= 1.
Note that the instance is fair in isolation with respect to equalized error rates as the cardinality
of both groups is the same (half of the population in each group) and the experts make the same
number of mistakes in both groups.
By construction, the algorithm has expected average loss of at least 1/2 in members of group A.
We now focus on group B. By the shifting approximate regret guarantee and given that there exists
a sequence of experts of length 2 that has 0 loss, it holds that the total loss of the algorithm needs
to be sublinear on T and, in particular, at most (1/2− α) · T2 , which implies an expected error rate
of 1/2− α. Subtracting the two error rates concludes the proof.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we introduce the study of avoiding discrimination towards protected groups in online
settings with non-i.i.d. examples. Our impossibility results for equalized odds consist of only two
phases, which highlights the challenge in correcting for historical biases in online decision making.
Our work also opens up a quest towards definitions that are relevant and tractable in non-i.i.d. online
settings for specific tasks. We introduce the notion of equalized error rates that can be a useful
metric for non-discrimination in settings where all examples that contribute towards the performance
also contribute towards fairness. This is the case in settings that all mistakes are similarly costly as
is the case in speech recognition, recommender systems, or online advertising. However, we do not
claim that its applicability is universal. For instance, consider college admission with two perfectly
balanced groups that correspond to ethnicity (equal size of the two groups and equal number of
positive and negatives within any group). A racist program organizer can select to admit all students
of the one group and decline the students of the other, while satisfying equalized error rates – this
does not satisfy equalized odds. Given the impossibility result we established for equalized odds,
it is interesting to identify definitions that work well for different tasks one encounters in online
non-i.i.d. settings. Moreover, although our positive results extend to the case where predictors are
vetted to be approximately non-discriminatory, they do not say anything about the case where the
predictors do not satisfy this property. We therefore view our work as a first step towards better
understanding non-discrimination in non-i.i.d. online settings.
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